Why illicit systems persist
In a recent email conversation with my colleague David Bray we discussed the Dark Web, This prompted me to research the elements that he mentioned a bit further.
The Dark Web does not endure because anonymity technologies are unstoppable. It survives because enforcement is fragmented, jurisdictions clash, and the cost of evasion often remains lower than the profits of illegal activity. When governments cooperate, dark web markets can be dismantled, infrastructure seized and operators arrested. When cooperation breaks down, illicit systems adapt and persist in the gaps.
This pattern is familiar. Money laundering, ransomware and sanctions evasion all follow the same logic. Success or failure depends far less on technology than on sustained international coordination. Where that coordination weakens, illegal infrastructure becomes economically viable again.
The strain on the rules-based order
Those same conditions are now emerging in outer space. International space governance was built on assumptions of good faith and state responsibility. The Outer Space Treaty presumes that governments will regulate actors operating under their authority and retain control over registered space objects. Transparency and registration were meant to prevent misuse. That framework only works when states choose to enforce it.
Today, that assumption is under strain. The United Nations Security Council is paralysed by rivalry among its permanent members. Russia and China routinely block Western initiatives. At the same time, the United States increasingly operates outside both international agreements and its own stated legal norms when it suits strategic or commercial interests, particularly in sanctions enforcement, cyber operations and surveillance. When the principal architect of the rules-based order selectively bypasses it, the system’s credibility erodes for everyone.
The result is a growing governance vacuum in emerging domains, and space is becoming one of them.
Space as a jurisdictional grey zone
Satellites operate in a legal and physical grey zone. Unlike terrestrial servers, they cannot be seized, raided or shut down by court order. A single satellite may be registered in one country, launched from another, controlled through ground stations in several jurisdictions and provide services to users worldwide. No single authority has comprehensive oversight.
Distributed satellite-based data processing magnifies this problem. On-orbit computing, encrypted routing and decentralised architectures are designed for resilience and efficiency, but they also frustrate supervision. Financial operations can be structured to occur beyond the immediate reach of regulators, exploiting ambiguity as a feature rather than a flaw.
Cryptocurrency removes the remaining brakes
Cryptocurrency completes the picture. On Earth, financial oversight relies on regulated intermediaries such as banks, payment processors and cryptocurrency exchanges and custodians. These entities are subject to anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism-financing rules: identifying customers, monitoring transactions and reporting suspicious activity.
If financial flows can bypass these intermediaries by routing activity through satellite-enabled systems, those safeguards weaken dramatically. Transactions become harder to trace, harder to freeze and harder to attribute.
The technical barriers to such arrangements are falling fast. Satellite miniaturisation has slashed costs. Launch prices have dropped sharply. Blockchain technology enables automated financial operations with minimal human involvement. What was once impractical is now merely unregulated.
Strategic risks beyond crime
The risks are strategic as well as criminal. Sanctioned states could access global markets through satellite-enabled financial platforms that Western regulators cannot easily disrupt. Authoritarian governments could offer such services to one another as mutual protection, creating a parallel financial system beyond democratic oversight. Terrorist organisations could receive funds and pay operatives without touching the banking networks intelligence agencies monitor.
This is not science fiction. It is the logical extension of technologies already in use, combined with geopolitical incentives that are intensifying as trust in global institutions declines.
Why delay makes enforcement dangerous
Experience with the Dark Web offers a clear warning. Illicit systems persist not because enforcement is impossible, but because it requires sustained cooperation that is increasingly absent. When major powers shield cybercriminals, refuse extradition or selectively ignore transparency rules, enforcement fails.
Space-based illicit infrastructure would be even harder to dismantle. Once entrenched, the remaining enforcement tools – jamming, cyber attacks or kinetic action – carry serious escalation risks. Political hesitation would likely allow such systems to mature before action is taken.
Closing the window
The window to act is closing. Licensing and registration of space activities must be treated as enforceable obligations, not symbolic gestures. States that refuse to control their registered space objects must face consequences in launch access, insurance, spectrum coordination and ground infrastructure. Anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism-financing frameworks must be adapted to space-enabled finance before circumvention becomes normalised.
The Dark Web thrives because jurisdictional gaps were tolerated. Money laundering persists because uncooperative havens were indulged. Space-based financial crime will succeed for the same reasons unless governments act now.
Paul Budde