Europe and the Russian threat: preparing for war or preparing for peace?

Reassessing the Russian threat

In my view, there is no doubt that Russia poses a serious threat to Ukraine. But how much of a threat is it to the rest of Europe? That question seems to be dominating political and military conversations across the continent and beyond. I believe the answer has profound implications—not just for defence spending but also for Europe’s identity, its leadership role, and its capacity to shape global affairs.

Lately, I’ve noticed a shift in tone from concern to alarm. Some leaders are even suggesting that Europe must prepare its citizens for war. While I understand the need for defence preparedness, I worry that this rhetoric may be overtaking reality and strategy. In my opinion, a balance is needed between realistic deterrence and unnecessary fearmongering.

From what I can tell, the war in Ukraine has revealed significant weaknesses in Russia’s military. Despite its initial gains, the Russian army has stalled, suffered heavy losses, and shown limitations in logistics and morale. I tend to agree with analysts who suggest that Russia lacks the capacity for a full-scale assault on NATO countries. Its ambitions may still target neighbouring, non-NATO states, but I find it unlikely that we’re looking at a continental war—unless Europe itself fractures.

Nuclear risks and the danger of miscalculation

That said, the spectre of nuclear war continues to loom in the background. Russia’s repeated nuclear threats, while often seen as bluster, cannot be entirely dismissed. However, I believe that actual nuclear use remains highly unlikely, as it would bring catastrophic consequences for all involved—including Russia. The doctrine of mutual destruction still acts as a powerful deterrent. This is precisely why escalation must be carefully managed. The risk is not just in direct confrontation, but in miscalculation.

A renewed focus on defence and values

Still, it’s hard to deny that Europe’s underinvestment in defence over the past three decades is now catching up. I think increased defence spending is not only reasonable but necessary. But the focus should be on modernisation, resilience, and coordination—not just ramping up militarisation. War readiness shouldn’t come at the cost of civic anxiety or our democratic values.

Europe’s moment for diplomatic leadership

At the same time, I strongly feel that Europe must reclaim a diplomatic role. With the United States veering toward isolationism, especially under figures like Donald Trump, I believe there’s both a need and a window of opportunity for European nations to step forward diplomatically. It is even more notable now that Trump has indicated that Putin is “pissing him off.” That unusual statement could be seen as an opening for Europe to assert leadership and take charge of a peace-oriented strategy.

Bringing Russia back into the European fold

A renewed European effort in negotiations—with Russia, Ukraine, and others—could present an alternative to blind escalation or passive dependency. It also raises a broader strategic question: should Europe try to bring Russia back into the fold, as it once was—however imperfectly—before 2010? I believe this is a question worth asking. The idea of a constructive relationship with Russia is not naive nostalgia; it’s rooted in the recognition that long-term European security cannot exist without some form of understanding with Moscow. After all, Russia is part of Europe—geographically, historically, and culturally.

Before 2010, Russia was more engaged with international institutions, economic cooperation was expanding, and there was at least the appearance of dialogue. That deteriorated sharply with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in Ukraine. But the total collapse of diplomatic bridges risks locking both sides into permanent hostility—a state that benefits no one.

If we accept that Europe cannot simply isolate Russia forever, then it seems logical to me that Europe should take the lead in imagining a framework for future re-engagement. This doesn’t mean abandoning Ukraine or excusing aggression. It means keeping the door open for a different Russia—one that might emerge from future political change.

To do this credibly, Europe would need to articulate a vision of post-conflict relations that includes conditions, expectations, and incentives. Such a vision must be realistic but hopeful. It requires confidence in our values, not submission to theirs. And crucially, it would have to be led by Europe, on European terms—not simply following the lead of the United States or waiting for Washington to set the pace.

Revitalising Europe’s global role

To be clear, I’m not advocating appeasement. Ukraine’s sovereignty should remain non-negotiable. But to me, dialogue and diplomacy are not signs of weakness—they are essential tools for preventing further bloodshed and creating long-term stability. Europe shouldn’t need a green light from the US to pursue peace.

Thinking more broadly about the geopolitical future, I often see predictions about a tripartite economic system dominated by the USA, China, and India—leaving Europe out. These forecasts challenge Europe’s ability to establish itself as an innovative and competitive global force. While I find these ideas sobering, I also see them as a wake-up call: Europe needs to revitalise its economic vision alongside its defence strategy.

One particular area where Europe is lagging is in the field of information and communications technology. As someone who has followed this space closely, I’ve written before about how the USA and China dominate the global digital landscape with tech giants that shape the platforms, data flows, and standards of the digital economy. Europe, by contrast, has yet to produce a global digital champion. This digital deficit not only hampers Europe’s competitiveness but also its strategic autonomy in an era increasingly defined by technological power. Any serious economic revitalisation must include a bold, coordinated investment in Europe’s digital future.

One possible way forward, in my opinion, is through deeper economic and strategic collaboration among democratic nations—not just within Europe but also including countries like Canada, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. That said, I realise that forming such a coalition without—or in defiance of—the United States would be enormously difficult, given the diversity of national interests and dependencies on China. If this kind of cooperation doesn’t materialise, I fear Europe could become a marginal player in a global system shaped by others.

At the same time, I wonder whether Europe should also reconsider its relationship with China. While China certainly presents its own challenges, it has not been pursuing overtly aggressive geopolitical goals in the same way as Russia and the USA. In a very balanced and pragmatic way, Europe might explore how to strengthen ties with China—not to replace the transatlantic alliance, but to ensure that Europe is not entirely dependent on the strategic direction of the United States. This would require a delicate balance, but it could also offer Europe greater strategic flexibility and a stronger voice in shaping the global order.

Conclusion: leadership through balance

In the end, I believe Europe stands at a critical crossroads. It must find a new balance between hard and soft power, between deterrence and diplomacy, and between independence and alliance. Europe must not only defend its borders but also defend its values—and its capacity to shape the world peacefully. Leadership, in this moment, means more than preparing for war. It means preparing for peace with strength, strategy, and vision.

Paul Budde