With Donald Trump in the White House, global markets are under pressure from erratic policy, economic nationalism, and the weaponisation of finance. But beyond the headlines lies a quieter, more profound shift—one that sits at the intersection of technology, economic sovereignty, and global power. This is where Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) come in, and why they matter now more than ever. I have written about this back in 2022.
CBDCs are not just a monetary tool—they are a technological infrastructure built on digital ledger technologies such as blockchain or secure databases that allow central banks to issue programmable, traceable, and interoperable digital versions of national currencies. In other words, CBDCs represent a digitally native upgrade to money itself, bypassing outdated international systems like SWIFT and reducing reliance on commercial bank networks.
From an ICT perspective, this is a transformative moment. CBDCs enable direct peer-to-peer value exchange between individuals, companies, and governments—without requiring intermediaries like commercial banks or third-party processors. They bring the potential for smart contracts, real-time international settlement, and increased transparency and efficiency in everything from welfare disbursements to cross-border trade.
In the face of Trump’s unpredictable financial policies and the growing global backlash against dollar dominance, CBDCs offer an opportunity for Western Economies to reclaim financial and technological sovereignty—but only if we act with urgency.
From Keynes to Trump: a broken system reasserts itself
I’ve previously written about the failure of the post-WWII Bretton Woods architecture to create a truly balanced global financial system. At its core, that failure was the rejection of John Maynard Keynes’s post war (1944) proposal for an International Clearing Union. Keynes rightly saw that global trade imbalances were destabilising, and he argued that both debtor and creditor nations should share responsibility. His idea of a bancor—a supranational currency to settle international accounts—was visionary, fair, and, unsurprisingly, vetoed by the U.S.
Why? Because America, then the world’s largest creditor, had no interest in being constrained.
Fast forward to 2025, and the U.S. is now the world’s largest debtor—a complete reversal. This debt burden has long bothered Trump, who sees the trade deficit and foreign-held debt as symptoms of a rigged global system. In principle, he’s not wrong—Keynes would have agreed. But unlike Keynes, Trump’s response is isolationist, erratic, and transactional, not cooperative or visionary. And the risk is that his approach could blow up the very system that still props up America’s economic clout.
Why the U.S. is afraid of CBDCs
Ironically, CBDCs could provide the tools to rebalance the system in a more stable and transparent way. They allow for:
- Direct cross-border payments without going through the U.S. dollar
- Programmable settlement conditions, including Keynes-style balancing mechanisms
- Reduced dependency on private banks and intermediaries
Yet the U.S. remains deeply reluctant. Why?
Because a CBDC threatens the dominance of the dollar, the power of Wall Street, and the entrenched position of commercial banks. More importantly, it threatens the unique geopolitical privilege the U.S. has enjoyed since WWII: the ability to run massive deficits without consequences, because the world must hold dollars to trade and invest.
A U.S. CBDC would expose structural weaknesses in this system. Worse (from the perspective of the American elite), it would create pathways for other countries to build dollar-free systems—and they are already doing it.
China and the BRICS are not waiting
While the West dithers, the rest of the world moves forward. China’s e-CNY is already live in dozens of cities and has been tested in cross-border settlements with the UAE and Thailand. The BRICS bloc is actively exploring a CBDC-based clearing mechanism—one that could settle trade outside of the dollar altogether.
These developments aren’t just technical upgrades. They are strategic moves to create financial sovereignty and resilience in a world where U.S. policy is increasingly seen as erratic and punitive.
Trump’s re-election is only accelerating this process. Allies and adversaries alike are quietly building escape hatches from a dollar-dominated system. The digital infrastructure for a multipolar financial world is already under construction.
Western Economies : still stuck in neutral
To use an example, where is Australia in all this? I reported on this and other countries a couple years ago.
Despite a well-run pilot by the RBA and Digital Finance CRC in 2023, we remain in a holding pattern. The official line is that the use cases for a retail CBDC are still “emerging,” and that the private banking system works well enough. But that complacency misses the point: CBDCs are not just about payment convenience—they are about strategic independence.
Relying on global systems increasingly controlled by an unpredictable U.S. administration is a vulnerability. Do we for example want to find ourselves in the position of European companies forced to abandon Iran deals because of U.S. secondary sanctions? Or of Asian countries watching their trade corridors disrupted because of the latest Trump tweet?
CBDCs offer a way to build resilience, reduce exposure to U.S. volatility, and help shape the next global monetary system, rather than being shaped by it.
We need action, not pilots
Let’s be clear: the West has fallen behind. While the U.S. fears its own decline and clings to outdated tools of financial control, others are building the future. If they don’t move soon, we risk being relegated to users of someone else’s system—again.
A well-designed CBDC—interoperable with others, privacy-protecting, and complementary to commercial banks—could position us as a trusted partner in a new era of digital finance. But that will require political will, regulatory clarity, and a clear break from our current complacency.
The window is closing. With Trump back in power, the risks are real—and so are the opportunities. We would do well to heed Keynes’s warning from 80 years ago: systems that serve only the few will eventually collapse under their own imbalance.
Paul Budde